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Introduction
This paper follows on from the work of Sinclair (1996, 1998) and
Meintjies (2000) on internal migration in South Africa and its political,
social and economic implications, both in terms of the social realities of
migrants and the broader political context within which internal mi-
grants are located. Over the last ten years internal migration in South
Africa has been characterised by a steady influx of former ‘bantustan’
residents into urban contexts in the former ‘white South Africa’, par-
ticularly those cities which are seen as holding potential for employ-
ment opportunities. Thus Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban,
Bloemfontein and Cape Town have had the largest influx of migrants
both just prior to the democratic elections of 1994 and thereafter. This
study focuses on the Cape Town urban area, and in particular the socio-
economic conditions of women migrants in urban townships.
Khayelitsha has served as the fieldwork site for this study, as with pre-
vious research on this issue.1 However, the intention here is to empha-
sise a particular facet of the challenges facing women migrants, namely
basic living conditions relating to water and sanitation and the related
issue of housing, and how these conditions are mediated at the level of
local and provincial government by service delivery policies that aim to
reduce poverty and improve living conditions for informal housing
dwellers, in particular women, and woman-headed households.2
The study draws on a sample of 55 interviews undertaken in
Khayelitsha in 2003/4.3 A video of several interviews also illustrates some
of the most pertinent issues raised by the research.4 The interviews aimed
at assessing basic water and sanitation service delivery conditions for
women and men to illustrate differential living conditions and access to
services. The socio-economic realities of women migrants is discussed
below in the context of local and provincial policies on service delivery,
particularly water and sanitation. The issue of water service delivery
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also highlights the second trajectory that this paper seeks to explore,
namely the question of the exercise of political rights by internal mi-
grants, and related to this, the degree to which migrants exercise their
political identity through participation around inadequate service de-
livery. The degree of social mobilisation in townships such as Khayelitsha
illustrates the extent to which a new sense of community and belonging
emerge in migrant communities. To try to determine this social cohe-
sion, as well as its potential for activism and resistance in the face of
political discontent, the notion of social movements is explored with
particular reference to gender and human rights. Do internal migrants
bring a sense of political identity with them to cities which translates
into political participation, especially in exercising basic rights? To what
extent do women and men share similar or different political identities?
To what extent do more marginalised groups, especially women, organ-
ise themselves to exercise their rights? Do chronically poor woman-
headed households even know their rights? Do they actively engage
politically and socio-economically? These are some of the questions that
the paper seeks to address against the backdrop of the fieldwork in
Khayelitsha.
Claiming space: Internal migration and
political identity
Gendered and general analytical issues linking the
local to the national and global
To what extent do migrants mobilise, especially marginalised, chroni-
cally poor women heads of households?5 This question has been dis-
cussed in various contexts. This analysis aims to place the question of
internal migrant mobilisation and political identity dynamics in the
context of social movements. Mobilisation can occur on the basis of an
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already organised social movement (represented by a number of non-
governmental organisations [NGOs], community-based organisations
[CBOs] and other informal community groupings) or it can arise around
an issue. In South Africa two such issues-based forms of mobilisation,
among many others, stand out in recent years: around the provision of
antiretrovirals to those finding themselves HIV-positive, and around
service delivery. In particular, the provision of Free Basic Water (FBW)
to all communities has brought to the fore the question of public goods
as human rights (Bond, 2000; 2002). Certainly the mobilisation around
HIV/Aids has been stronger; however, the institutionalisation of a FBW
policy has led to further mobilisation on the issue of water and services
to the poor, both on the part of ‘old’ and ‘new’ types of social move-
ments. However, it is not clear to what extent the overwhelming number
of migrants in formal and informal settlements exercise their rights to
the constitutionally enshrined right to water. Compounded with the
lack of adequate housing and employment, many township communi-
ties are still living in conditions of chronic poverty, and even basic wa-
ter and sanitation remain far from adequate in many urban township
areas. As the case study undertaken by the CSAS highlights (and as is
graphically illustrated by the video made in Khayelitsha), despite gov-
ernment promises on service delivery, basic water and sanitation condi-
tions leave much to be desired in many areas.
How have marginalised groups, particularly women, located them-
selves within broader streams of resistance to poor service provision? In
terms of the analysis of social movements in developmental contexts,
there is some scepticism about the degree to which the marginalised
mobilise. For example, approaches to national social movements tend
to focus on the motivations that groups develop for being involved in
the kinds of activities that characterise social movements. More positiv-
ist accounts tend to emphasise aspects such as political opportunity struc-
tures, social capital and public opinion frames (Ibarra et al, 2003: 8-9).
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Approaches that emphasise the more anti-systemic revolutionary po-
tential of social movements tend to focus more on the interplay be-
tween political and economic power between the global and the local
that discipline social movements. For example, Arrighi et al (1989: 27)
and Cox (1987) point out that one of the growing weaknesses of old
social movements, i.e. labour movements, has been the international
commodification of labour and the transnationalisation of production.
Cox (1987) has pointed out that this has led to a cooptation of organised
labour and the fragmentation of casual labour on a global scale.
Stienstra (1999: 264) drawing on the critical theory of Cox (1987,
1997) notes how he collapses the liberal distinction between state and
civil society. This approach argues that “the state relies on the institu-
tions which make up civil society to reinforce, or respond to the under-
lying principles of consent”, or, as Gramsci (1971: 244) put it: “the State
is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but man-
ages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules”. Civil soci-
ety, and social movements, both national and global, may find that their
activism results in influencing ruling elites and knowledge, but not nec-
essarily in radical transformation of existing power relations. Feminists
also emphasise aspects other than class that lead to marginalisation and
lack of participation. Stienstra (1999: 262-266) points out that in addi-
tion to class, gender, race/ethnicity and sexual orientation also play into
power dynamics at both the local and global levels and further, “norms
are shaped by historical inequalities as well as local situations” (see also
Tickner, 1992, Parpart, 1995 and Steady, 2002). The success or failure
of some social movements above others thus has to do with both local/
global alliances, as well as the relations of social movements to domi-
nant national and global institutions.
There is considerable controversy, borne out in the literature in in-
ternational relations, development and other disciplines, about the ex-
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tent to which NGOs (local, national and international) ‘represent’ so-
cial movements, as well as how collective identities and social move-
ments coalesce. However, Stienstra (1999: 264) states:
(a)lthough social movements are not limited to organisations,
they do need organisations to mobilise resources over a sus-
tained period of time. Organisations provide structure and
leadership to social movement activity and are able to mobi-
lise resources and place demands on the state and other insti-
tutions.
This institutionalisation of social movement activism may also bring
about the gradual cooptation of the movement, thereby weakening its
transformatory potential. Also, the degree to which grassroots social
movements link up with broader national and global social movements
can remove some of the specificity of purpose of local and regional
alliances. Steady (2002: 79-94), for example, argues that the women’s
movement in Africa has been successful in ensuring representation and
political equality but not in global economic or developmental terms
and that global solidarity with the ‘white feminist’ movement has been
of limited usefulness to the needs of the African women’s movement,
particularly in terms of economic marginalisation. Sen and Grown (1987),
Tickner (1992), Parpart (1995), Pettman (1996) and Steinstra (1999), point
out in a similar vein that there are many factors that mediate the con-
cerns of the women’s movement in the South as opposed to the North.
The degree to which economic marginalisation affects women in devel-
opmental contexts is one of the primary factors which distinguish
‘Northern’ (white) feminist activist concerns from their ‘Southern’ coun-
terparts.
An aspect which is not highlighted in this context, but which may be
of considerable importance, is the degree to which internal migration
may influence political identity formation and social mobilisation. To
what extent do the very marginalised represent communities that have
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been set adrift from their communal and societal ties? Does this corre-
spond with migration/geographical dislocation? These questions may
help to determine with greater accuracy which groups in local contexts
tend to mobilise and which do not. As Stienstra (1999: 264) points out,
“gender, race/ethnicity, class and colonisation also shape the internal
relations within movements”. This goes for local and national as well as
global manifestations of the movement.
Solidarity, even in a national context, can be problematic. Steady
(2002: 91-92) says of the South African women’s movement context:
(i)n the new South Africa, feminist struggle is especially com-
plicated by the challenge of bringing together women from
diverse racial, class, ethnic and geographical backgrounds.
For many black women, the struggle against racism is su-
preme because many institutionalised forms of racism remain
intact…(m)any black women rejected feminism as a white
American import that would dilute the liberation struggle.
After all, although apartheid has been legally abolished, South
Africa remains a country of extreme contradictions.
Similarly the North and South blend across geographical bounda-
ries: discrimination on the basis of race and gender is prevalent in states
and societies usually thought of as westernised and developed (the so-
called North, or the ‘West’).
Sen and Grown (1987), Tickner ( 1992), Stienstra ( 1999), Steady (2002)
and Murphy (2002) all emphasise the degree to which the internationali-
sation of production in the current globalised world economy has, to a
large extent, prevented the success of liberal, egalitarian politics, includ-
ing the more ‘bourgeois’ forms of national and global social movements.
As Murphy (2002: 205) puts it:
Specific regional and national patterns of effective egalitar-
ian politics reflect historical political opportunity structures
that may or may not allow the formation of coalitions of a
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scale necessary to transform neoliberal globalisation. Over
the last two decades, egalitarian politics have made a differ-
ence; but they have not contained – and perhaps they cannot
contain – the forces now working to make a less equal world.
Stienstra (1999) and Murphy (2002: 208) also point out that different
states provide different ‘political opportunity structures’ (as well as
notions of equality) within which social movements must form and
function. The opportunities for social mobilisation among women in
mainland China or in Malaysia and Indonesia would be, in this context,
somewhat different from the realities of women’s movements in Africa.
Nonetheless, the global women’s movement is said to be one of the
strongest of such ‘supranational’ movements currently active in the glo-
bal arena. Local and national mobilisations on women’s issues, while
divided on issues of ideology and purpose, have nonetheless frequently
managed to share sufficient solidarity to influence both national and
global governance institutions (Steinstra, 1994, 1999). There also seems
to be a general acceptance of the need for solidarity, not only in terms
of the women’s movement locally, nationally, regionally and globally,
but also between the women’s movement and other movements (Sen
and Grown, 1987: 96; Murphy, 2002: 210). Emphasising the need for
solidarity and learning between national and global social movements,
O’Brien et al (2000: 64) point out that the success of the women’s move-
ment in lobbying various multilateral institutions, in particular the
World Bank, has been tempered by the its lack of resources, but also:
…lack of lobbying expertise, as well as the technical barrier
of economic planning languages, and the fact the women’s
economic interests can clash, particularly across differences
of class and nation.
Turning to the ways in which social movements arise and mobilise
in different national contexts, there is dispute among social movement
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approaches on whether the lack of participation of poorer groups in
urban areas is simply due to very marginalised groups being too con-
cerned with survival to become too involved in socio-economic devel-
opmental issues, and consequently in forms of activism – be these part
of social movements or not. Survey work, such as that undertaken by
the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) for the 2002
Chronic Poverty Report (CPR) in the Western Cape supports the
former view. Levels of education and knowledge are said to be of criti-
cal importance here, as these affect the ability of groups to participate
in meaningful ways, especially in areas requiring at least some scientific
or technological know-how. Furthermore, as the CPR underlines, with
the vast majority of households earning less than R1 000 per month
(and many of these even less than that), survival issues have both an
immediate and ongoing significance.
Cox,6 an historian working in the area of global political economy,
has developed a framework that locates the relation of social forces to
production in the developing world as a way of understanding their
capacity to become involved in transformatory social movements. Cox’s
argument is the reverse of the commonly held belief that poorer groups
do not mobilise. He emphasises that these communities have the most
to benefit and the least to lose in attempting to change their socio-
economic position. Cox’s conceptualisation of social forces is not nar-
rowly equivalent to classes (although classes form part of social forces).
As Leysens puts it:
…social forces consist of groups who are conceptualised in
terms of what material and non-material goods are produced,
and to the state which attempts to manage the environment
in which this takes place.
According to Cox, social change (transformation) at the state and
world order levels can be expected to emanate from the group that is
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excluded from the benefits of the dominant mode of production, i.e.
the marginalised (Leysens, 2004: 7). Cox adds, however, that this group
does tend to be the most powerless, and thus its transformatory poten-
tial is reduced by its lack of influence and by an inclination towards
apathy.
Cox defines three categories of relations in the global world order.
These categories apply in the developed as well as the developing con-
text, but the numbers which make up those who are marginally and
precariously integrated are far higher in the developing state context.
According to Cox (1999: 9) the categories are as follows:
• Those who are fully integrated into formal production processes.
These include those who find themselves in managerial positions
and are influential in decisions surrounding global production
(i.e. the transnational managerial class).
• Those who are precariously integrated. This would include semi-
skilled workers whose production function is dispensable and
who can easily be replaced by cheaper labour elsewhere (i.e. in
terms of the transnationalisation of production).
• Those who are marginalised in global production processes. This
includes groups that are not part of formal production proc-
esses, or that are poorly integrated into these structures, semi-
subsistence and subsistence farmers for example, as well as the
unskilled and those who have been pushed off their land or who
have left rural areas to find better economic opportunities and
living conditions in urban areas.
Leysens (2004: 7-8) has used Cox’s categories above to show, using
Afrobarometer survey data, that the  ‘marginalised’ in southern Africa
tend to participate less in both formal and informal participatory proc-
esses, as their ‘transformatory potential’ is curtailed by the effort to
survive on the periphery of the formal economy. In effect this brings
10
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Cox’s argument into line with the perspective he sets out to debunk,
namely that the poor have less transformatory potential.
The study of gendered participation on service delivery in the area
of urban water service delivery and resource management undertaken
in this paper, while very small, indicates that the transformatory poten-
tial of some marginalised groups may tend to be circumscribed by their
peripheralisation and hence their immediate preoccupation with sur-
vival. But such a generalisation is precisely that, and in many cases can
detract from what mobilisation does in fact take place. Even though the
case study is small – 55 randomly chosen families representing a seg-
ment of ‘the poor’ – it shows that mobilisation does take place – albeit
not necessarily in the realm of local-global social movements. It is ar-
gued here that the theory of social movements does tend to highlight
organised resistance but leaves understandings of ad hoc behaviour rather
unclear. This has led towards a popular (and academic) perception that
marginalised groups do not mobilise or that they exercise relatively lit-
tle power. This may not always be the case. Rather like ‘grey literature’,
it seems more the case that such activism is overlooked because it does
not fit into the frame of social movement activity.
In the context of this research, namely the Western Cape, though
some issues relating to water resource management have resulted in or-
ganised grassroots activism (namely the process leading up to the ap-
proval and building of the Skuifraam Dam), at the same time there does
seem to be some evidence to show that quite a large proportion of
marginalised households participate sporadically on issues regarding serv-
ices as well as on service related issues (Thompson, 2005, forthcoming).
Steady (2002: 78) argues that:
Movements can seize or create political opportunities through
continuous consciousness raising efforts and responses to spe-
cific events. Events that threaten women’s livelihood or that
11
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of their families, such as a steep rise in the cost of living, struc-
tural adjustment conditionality, armed conflict and oppressive
governments have had the most galvanising  effect.
The degrees to which ‘threats to livelihood’ are posed seem to be key
to understanding women’s mobilisation, as well as the local and na-
tional political opportunity structure. However, it would seem that
activism does not always add up to ongoing collective identity or ac-
tion. The case study work, while aiming to generate some basic statisti-
cal information, is obviously too small a sample to make major quanti-
tative generalisations. The idea behind the interviews was to get a feel-
ing for the sub-text of Khayelitsha – the everyday realities of service
delivery to households with incomes ranging from as little as R500-600
to above R2 000.7  The degree to which lack of adequate water and
sanitation services affected different households was quite varied, as the
discussion below indicates. However the degree to which communities
mobilised showed more clear-cut characteristics: while there was evi-
dence of community mobilisation around services, it tended to be largely
ad hoc, largely unorganised and sporadic. Nonetheless it is there.
Related to this is the degree to which political identity and forms of
social mobilisation occur in migrant communities in Khayelitsha, espe-
cially woman-headed households. Do migrants from within South Af-
rica have a sense of their rights and do they act upon them? To what
extent do government policies influence or become influenced by pat-
terns of social mobilisation (or the lack of them)? Before turning to an
analysis of the Khayelitsha fieldwork, a brief sketch is provided of the
context within which national/provincial water service delivery takes place.
12
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Informal housing studies and water services
and sanitation
Who participates as ‘stakeholders’ in water security?
In terms of the fieldwork on water security, stakeholders and participa-
tion in the Western Cape, one of the first, most apparent aspects has
been the relative lack of organised participation of certain communities
on the periphery of the urban economy. These groups have the most to
gain from participation, and the direness of their circumstances in terms
of even basic technologies concerning water and sanitation is the most
acute. For example, in a study conducted for the Cape Town Metro-
politan Council (CMC) in 2003, it was shown that in informal settle-
ments (i.e. zinc housing or the equivalent) the majority of households
(84%) do not even have access to bucket-type toilets and 98% do not
have access to toilet facilities that are hygienic and safe (Nielson, 2003).8
Nonetheless, formal participation in the area of water security and serv-
ice delivery is low in the townships generally and in informal settle-
ments in particular. It is also clear that even where housing has been
upgraded (to brick housing with taps and toilets either inside or in the
yard), levels of participation around service delivery are very low, with
98% never having interacted with local municipalities on water services
or service delivery. In the context of the very low integration of com-
munity organisations into policy debates and discussions around ‘brown’
environmental issues, it goes without saying that participation around
‘green’ environmental issues is virtually non-existent, possibly due to a
lack of interest as well as knowledge. In Nielson’s 2003 survey in infor-
mal settlements, 61% of all respondents had not heard of National Water
Week, National Arbor Day, National Marine Day or World Water
Day, for example.
13
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On the other hand, taken in broader perspective, there is evidence of
participation as well as the formation of nascent social movements on
the basis of participation in housing forum initiatives (which include
service delivery in general), such as the Homeless People’s Federation
and similar groupings, for example, the People’s Housing Network Fo-
rum (established under the auspices of the Development Action Group
[DAG], which is financed by international donors). In the urban con-
text, then, it is clear that concern with, and involvement in, water re-
source management on the part of the majority of poorer households is
in terms of ‘brown’ environmental issues concerning basic water and
sanitation provision, even though representation and participation seems
very uneven. Housing groups are the most active in already established
or establishing formal housing clusters in the townships (Shamil Manie,
DAG, interview, 15 March 2004). Participation and representation in
informal housing areas remains very poor. These groupings do have
women representatives – mostly internal migrants – but there is a ten-
dency for broader social mobilisation platforms to be used, rather than
gender specific ones.
In contrast, the CMC 2003 study showed that in more affluent (pre-
dominantly white) areas, levels of participation are fair, partly due to
‘satisfaction’ with services and reticulation, and partly due to the exist-
ence of ratepayers’ associations in these areas, where membership is usu-
ally quite low, but where homeowners feel their interests are being rep-
resented even in their absence (free riding).9
Overall, according to the service delivery survey done by Nielson
(2003), levels of civic responsibility appear to be high, with 96% of mid-
dle- and high-income households stating that it is a residential duty to
report leaks and 92% of residents in informal settlements agreeing with
this statement. There does not seem to be the same level of actual civic
involvement around service delivery. Middle- and high-income house-
holds were slightly more likely to enquire/complain about leaks, water
14
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restrictions and water quality (around 2-3%), while informal settlements’
dealings with municipalities averaged about 1%. However, poorer com-
munities have a lot more to gain from civic involvement, as the follow-
ing sections make clear.
The context: Water resource management in
the Western Cape and service delivery
The total area of the City of Cape Town (CCT) comprises some
2474 km2, with a coastline of approximately 371 km. This area includes
not only Cape Town central, but also outlying areas such as Tygerberg,
Helderberg and Blaauwberg (WSDP, 2001: 6). However, the CCT also
vies for water with outlying agricultural areas, including Berg River
end users (in the Langebaan, Vredendal and Saldanha area), as well as
Malmesbury, Wellington, Paarl and Franschhoek. The Boland, West
Coast and Drakenstein municipalities buy bulk water from the CCT.
According to the Water Services Act of 1997, all water services au-
thorities are obliged to formulate Water Services Development Plans
(WSDPs). The Cape Town metropolitan area (CMA), comprising six
former metropolitan local councils and the Cape Metropolitan Council
(CMC) as the bulk supplier before 2000, have been amalgamated to
form the City of Cape Town. The local metropolitan councils now
form administrative units, with the CMC still in charge of bulk serv-
ices. The WSDPs have to be submitted to the Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) to show that municipalities are manag-
ing their water supply in conjunction with their Integrated Develop-
ment Plans (IDPs). This is to ensure that historical service backlogs are
met and that all sectors of the community benefit from enhanced serv-
ice delivery (WSDP, 2001: 3-5).
The WSDP characterises the CCT as water scarce area for two main
reasons:
15
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• the Cape is a winter rainfall area, placing pressure on water stor-
age to provide sufficient water for the hot summer months;
• Cape Town is expanding rapidly due to an influx of migrants
from the Eastern and Northern Cape.10
One of the major challenges for the newly amalgamated CCT, then,
is providing adequate water and sanitation supply to informal growth
areas, in addition to formal growth in the Tygerberg, Blaauwberg and
Helderberg areas. According the WSDP, part of the problem of ad-
equate supply lies in the illegal occupation of land by migrants, as well
as the culture of non-payment for services which forestalls plans to convert
sanitation services to more expensive water borne sewerage systems.
In terms of the Water Services Act, the CCT is beholden to supply
basic services to all as a fundamental right. It is stipulated in section 11.2
that “everyone has right of access to basic water supply and basic sanita-
tion”. In terms of this the CCT has committed itself to drafting a Serv-
ice Delivery Strategy which will include the following commitments:
“on-site water and water borne sanitation to all formal sites” ( this in-
cludes formal sites in townships, of course); “free basic level of water to
all households within 200m” and “access to communal toilets or some form
of shared toilet, depending on local conditions” (WSDP, 2001: 21).
According to the WSDP, service levels in the CCT “generally meet
the requirements of the Water Services Act, i.e. communal standpipe
within 200m walking distance and at least a ventilated improved pit
latrine (VIP) or equivalent (container toilet, formalised black bucket,
communal toilet or chemical toilet)” (WSDP, 2001:19). This statement
is only partially backed up by the informal settlements survey done by
Nielson (2003) for the CCT, as well as the CSAS’s independent field-
work. Ninety-eight per cent of informal residents did not have access
even to bucket-type toilets, and similarly 98% did not find toilet facili-
ties hygienic and safe. Most respondents who did not have access to a
toilet used the nearby veldt. As Nielson points out, “…it is alarming
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that this happens in the majority of households in informal areas”. A
survey conducted in 2001 ascertained that at the time, 10 000 of ap-
proximately 92 000 informal households in the Western Cape did not
have access to even basic water services and 16 000 did not have access to
basic sanitation. The reason given was that these households occupied
illegal land. According to Van Niekerk (Interview, 15 June 2004), as of
2004 there were approximately 140 settlements with dwelling units just
in excess of 100 000 (based on aerial photographs), where about 400 000
people live. Most of these settlements have been partially serviced. The
City Council ruled that by July 2004 all informal settlements, regard-
less of the legality of their land occupation, would receive at least rudi-
mentary services. Our fieldwork clearly highlights that this has not hap-
pened. Just as important, however, is the question of how effective ba-
sic services are.
Many informal households share water and toilet facilities in ex-
tremely crowded circumstances. In all of the townships the practice of
‘erf sharing’ is the norm, where a formal house is surrounded by shacks.
Shacks are also found in public spaces and wherever available land al-
lows (around stations and other public amenities). Thus while water
access may not be the issue, service delivery is. Also, the CCT Exco
decision on the provision of basic services does not include backyard
dwellings in places like Khayelitsha but only applies to informal hous-
ing on council or private land. The safety and security of the very
marginalised (especially new migrant families) tend to be made more
precarious in these living conditions.
One of the central findings of the interviews undertaken by the CSAS
in Khayelitsha as part of this research was that safe access to sanitation
and to water are two of the highest priorities in terms of improved
service delivery to informal residents, in particular women and chil-
dren. Though access to water may not be so much of an issue, obtaining
water may nonetheless require walking some distance, often at night
17
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and in high crime areas. Given the high influx of informal residents, the
political necessity of providing adequate water to informal areas, and
the culture of non-payment, the CCT has placed fairly limited faith in
water demand management (WDM) as a strategy. Solutions to the prob-
lem of water scarcity are sought on the supply side of the water tech-
nologies continuum.11 In conjunction with DWAF, the CCT has ob-
tained public approval (though a process of co-opted participation) for
the building of the R1.6 billion Skuifraam Dam (the Berg Water Project),
the building of which will commence in 2004/5 (Thompson, 2005, forth-
coming). This process has included marginalised groups, but mostly
according to the principle of ‘affected communities’, through which
mostly rural communities affected by the building of the dam have
been consulted. Very little urban civil society participation has been
forthcoming, with the exception of the environmental movement. How-
ever, the effects of tariff increases on poor residents may lead to mobi-
lisation in the future, as is discussed below.
The CCT, national and international environmental
management initiatives
Cape Town’s water management strategy has had to evolve against a
background of changing national legislation as well as South Africa’s
stated commitments to regional and international best practice guide-
lines on sustainable water usage. South Africa supported the Bonn Dec-
laration and the final report of the World Commission on Dams, enti-
tled Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making,
among other international commitments to participatory WRM. How-
ever, at both national and regional levels the gap between policy pro-
nouncements and policy practice is high. There is also still an ongoing
emphasis on dam building, which emerges again in the government’s
new National Water Resource Strategy. Liane Greeff, a representative
of the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), one of the most vo-
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ciferous NGOs on water related issues at the local and national level,
said:
We feel very upset that the National Water Resource Strat-
egy had 16 dams identified and the whole WCD approach is
saying look at what the needs are, then look at what the
options are and then look at what the solutions are. Dam
building is only one option. But the NWR strategy is heavily
tilted towards dams. (EMG, Interview, 16 July 2004)
There is a discrepancy between stated commitments and policy prac-
tice. For example, if we follow the national commitments down to the
provincial/local level, according to Cape Town’s WSDP, “all initiatives
must conform to…national as well as international law and
legislation…such as the International Convention on Biodiversity and
the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)” (WSDP, 2001:
54). The former CMC undertook regular ‘state of the environment’
reports, which the CCT has continued. In addition the Environmental
Conservation Act (ECA) makes it mandatory to conduct environmen-
tal impact assessments for “certain scheduled construction activities”. In
accordance with this, the stated philosophy of CMC administration is
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) and it is initiating IEM
systems. Nonetheless, there is not much evidence of IEM in practice,
especially in terms of public participation. This is clear both on the
demand side (especially but not only in terms of water service delivery
to the poor) but also on the supply side, as the Skuifraam Dam (or Berg
Water Project, as it is also called), makes clear.
The Skuifraam Dam, the building of which began in 2004, is a good
example of how international/national/local linkages may lead to some
forms of social mobilisation and not to others (Thompson, 2004). Gov-
ernment has argued that participatory processes make such processes
open and transparent, and that the public performs a watchdog func-
tion in this regard. However, this is often not possible due to the nature
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of the participatory process. Environmental impact assessment reports,
similarly, can be used as ‘stamps of scientific approval’ without neces-
sarily addressing the concerns of citizens.12
The broader implications of the Berg Water Project have also been
contained by government by setting up participatory structures, such
as the Environmental Monitoring Committee (EMC), which have ex-
cluded certain groups such as the urban poor, who will arguably feel
the effects of the higher services charges for water over the next ten
years in spite of the FBW allowance. According to Nielson, 59% of
informal residents state they pay for water over and above the FBW
allowance. CSAS fieldwork shows that 54% of respondents pay for water.
Patrick Dowling of the Wildlife and Environmental Society of South-
ern Africa (WESSA) makes the following point in the context of the
bigger picture within which the question of supply and demand man-
agement of water and participation in the Western Cape takes place:
What I find quite extraordinary is that this water is not for
Franschhoek (where the dam is being built). Franschhoek is in
a different municipality, the water is for the City of Cape
Town. Yet all the meetings are in Franschhoek. On the one
hand this is understandable as it is on their doorstep, but on
the other hand this is an issue that Cape Town should have
more involvement in, in terms (of the question of) is this
sustainable development? Reaching our ceiling of demand
and then going out and finding a new dam site?. Can you
keep meeting growth demands at this rate? Certainly not
geophysically and nor will it be feasible on ecological grounds.
South Africa has a number of very large dams, the product
of the last hundred years, but we cannot go on like this for
the next three hundred years. Can you keep on meeting wa-
ter demands like this at this sort of rate? Not just for our
children and our grandchildren – it seems to stop at our grand-
children – but what happens after that?
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It is not clear that poorer communities are interested in the more
‘green’ issues that Dowling refers to above. As Greeff points out, social
mobilisation is more likely to occur when such groups mobilise around
an issue or are mobilised by groupings such as the environmental move-
ment in conjunction with ‘old’ social movements, such as labour, around
the questions pertaining in particular to the economic consequences of
government’s natural resources development plans. Greeff states:
If you have an anti-privatisation march you will have a lot
of people out on the streets…if you have an anti-dam march
people would come - but if the connection hasn’t been made
for community groups, they will not be as interested. But if
you say to people here is your water bill and this is what is
attributable to the dam, then people would be much more
vocal. (Interview, 16 July 2004)
Up until this point, these effects have not yet materialised. In 2004
higher tariffs were introduced along with water restrictions (imposed
in November) and punitive measures for flouting restrictions, with fines
of R10 000 for using water in restricted times, but these have not led to
broad-based mobilisation on water (Cape Times, August 25, 2004). De-
spite articles by this writer to local papers providing information that
the CCT did not impose restrictions in 2003/4 as it was considered
‘politically unfavourable’ during the elections (Van Zyl, interview, May
2004), there has been no resistance in terms of mobilisation around wa-
ter tariffs. Thus, while poor water management on the part of the CCT
is being passed on to urban consumers, rich and poor, mainstream and
marginal alike, policies have been unchallenged besides letters to the
newspapers by mostly affluent white consumers.
The tariffs for water will increase over the next few years as the ‘step
up’13 tariffs for funding the BWP are implemented. It will be interest-
ing to observe whether resistance will be the case among both poor and
rich communities as well as the degree to which communities need to be
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financially squeezed before high levels of mobilisation take place. Argu-
ably there is a ‘political opportunity structure’ in place, as the CCT has
stated that public feedback on the 2004 water restrictions will be al-
lowed. However, in the past both poorer and richer communities have
accepted water restrictions without much fuss. The 2000/2001 water
restrictions were accepted as necessary by 78% of informal settlement
respondents, although 33% did not know that water restrictions had
been lifted by 2002 and only 59% thought that water restrictions were
adhered to. However, 90% of richer communities accepted that water
restrictions were necessary with only 52% knowing that water restric-
tions had been lifted, so lack of knowledge does not seem to be unique
to less well-off households.
The cost of water service delivery to poorer
communities
As of 2001, the estimated costs of a three year programme to supply
basic water and sanitation was R7 million (WSDP, 2001: 88). However,
ongoing high levels of migration to both established townships as well
as both public and private land resulted in the CCT decision of 2003/4
to provide emergency or rudimentary services to all informal settle-
ments. According to Van Niekerk (interview, 15 June, 2004) this in-
cludes settlements on private land where the CCT has tried to negotiate
to put in services even though not all private landowners agree to this.
Some turn a blind eye, or offer to sell the land to the council, but
frequently at very inflated prices. The CCT then puts the services on
the perimeters of land, with or without the consent of the landowner.
The change from previous policy was an Executive Council decision by
the CCT to ensure basic sanitation and water (plus electricity) for health
and safety reasons. The  decision was justified as a constitutional obliga-
tion and for humanitarian reasons, but there is a need to put a bylaw in
place to ensure the process’s legality.
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However, as mentioned, the provision of services does not include
backyard dwellers in places like Khayelitsha, but applies to informal
housing on council or private land. Part of the problem is that informal
housing in established areas like Khayelitsha continues to grow, placing
great strain on existing infrastructure. Even where services are being
provided to new informal settlements on the periphery of more estab-
lished townships, such as Harare settlement in Khayelitsha, the levels of
service provided depends on the population density of the settlement.
According to Van Niekerk, the principle is “some to all rather than all
to some”. In some cases services are thus very rudimentary. The 200m
standpipe average is being revised depending on the density of settle-
ment (interview, 15 June 2004). According to the CSAS interviews, while
only 35% of respondents did not have a toilet or access to one, most of
the remaining 63% had to share facilities.14 As mentioned earlier, Nielson’s
figures for lack of toilet facilities in informal settlements is even higher,
with 84% not even having access to bucket-type toilets and 98% not
finding that toilet facilities are hygienic and safe.
Cost recovery is not practiced for informal settlements on illegally
occupied land, but is practiced in larger townships such as Khayelitsha,
regardless of whether the house is a shack or more formal dwelling. If it
has a direct water supply, the CCT bills for household consumption
over 6 kl per month (Ramsay, 15 June 2004). According to Ramsay, the
question remains whether it is worth rendering an account to poorer
households:
A house (worth) less than R50 000 get the first 6 kl of water
free, they get a rates rebate, sewerage is free, and they get a
R20 towards the bill. So is it worth sending a bill? You are
not getting anything out of that. You have to weigh up send-
ing the bill against keeping track of the person so that if they
start using a lot of water you can actually send them a bill.
All those sorts of issues we are trying to deal with.
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This statement contrasts with the percentage of households claiming
they pay for water in Khayelitsha. According the CSAS interviews,
40% of all households claim they pay for water, and 49% of woman-
headed households claim they pay the municipality for water usage (see
Appendices 1 and 2). Nielson’s data similarly show that 59% of infor-
mal housing dwellers pay for water.
Customer debt is estimated at R460 million and is likely to rise by
R50 million a year. Part of the problem, according to the WSDP, is
income levels in poor communities. Approximately one third of house-
holds in the CMA earn less than R1 100 a month and over 25% of these
households earn less than R612 a month. Their ability to pay for serv-
ices is thus severely restricted. Calculated on the basis of the income of
the poorest 25%, it is estimated that a total bill for services could not be
more than R61 a month with about R18 of that allocated to water.
However, many households have erratic income and so these projec-
tions are acknowledged as very inaccurate.
However, David Ramsay, Director for Water Services for the CCT,
states that the extent to which poorer communities subsidise richer ones
is minimal due to the introduction of FBW and the indigents grant
(Ramsay, Interview, 18 May 2004). The CCTs approach to water tariffs
for urban consumers assumes that most families are able to survive on
6 kl of water per month, an issue which is contested by activists in
unions and by some environmental NGOs such as the EMG. Where
the 6 kl are exceeded, poor households must still pay for services at the
same rate as any other urban domestic consumer (the tariffs are on a
sliding scale). The study undertaken by the CSAS in Khayelitsha shows
that a large percentage of those whose income is less than R1 000 per
month are women. The interviews show that 37% of woman-headed
households earn less than between R100 and R550 and 36% earn be-
tween R550 and R950. While the random sample is small, it shows the
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extent to which some migrant15 women heads of households are con-
strained in their ability to pay for basic services, and the potential nega-
tive effects of raised tariffs.
How will the building of the Skuifraam Dam affect poor communi-
ties? According to the CCT’s figures, the average increase in water tar-
iffs will be around 10% per year for the next five years, almost doubling
the cost of water in the next 10 years.16 This does not take into account
punitive water tariffs should water restrictions be introduced. This step
up, step down tariffing approach is said to involve the least risk to the
CCT in the building of the dam  and will mean that future supply
schemes can be implemented towards the end of the decade (CCT, 2004;
Killick, CCT, interview 15 June 2004). The full impact of the Skuifraam
Dam on tariffs will only be felt towards the end of the building process
when unforeseen costs will have a knock-on effect on the full amount
owing. Before then the higher tariffs, in conjunction with water restric-
tions, are going to make rich and poor communities alike take notice of
their water bills.
As mentioned above, there has been little protest or resistance to
water tariff increases up until this point by either affluent or poorer
ratepayers. This seems less as a result of apathy than of a lack of knowl-
edge, combined with the effects of the CCT’s ongoing propaganda about
how water scarce the Western Cape has become. The provision of in-
formation to the public on the cost implications of the Skuifraam Dam
has been sorely lacking, and the environmental movement has not been
very successful in obtaining figures from government. As Greeff (EMG)
and Dowling (WESSA) have pointed out, the motivation of groups like
the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) to mobilise has
usually been linked to the effect which WRM has on poorer communi-
ties. The CCT and DWAF thus have reason to be hesitant in divulging
the full financial implications of the Skuifraam Dam on tariffs. The
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Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), which is based in Cape
Town, has been asking since 1999 what the implications of the building
of the Skuifraam Dam would be for the consumer. According to Greeff
they were told in 1999/2000 by CCT and DWAF that the costs would
be “negligible”. As has been discussed, this is far from the truth, espe-
cially if taken in conjunction with the CCT’s rather lackadaisical WDM
policies which have led to the imposition of water restrictions in 2004.
The Khayelitsha study
Both nascent and more established community groupings are involved
to some extent in service delivery and natural resource management in
the townships, through, for example, the Khayelitsha Water Forums
(Ramsay, Interview, June 2004) and the Homeless People’s Federation.
However, there seems to be a very ad hoc, unorganised approach to
participation and mobilisation around service delivery issues, especially
water related ones, in spite of the obvious dangers that poor services
pose to migrant communities. Mobilisation around water related issues
has happened to some extent in connection with the Berg Water Project,
mainly through the environmental movement in conjunction with un-
ions such as Samwu. But do the marginalised really participate in any
meaningful way in these and related participatory processes? This sec-
tion aims to briefly outline some of the responses by both male- and
female-headed migrant households in Khayelitsha with regard to their
qualitative living standards (as well as their perceptions thereof) and
their sense of political identity, as well as the degree to which they have
mobilised on water service delivery. The discussion is based on the quali-
tative responses to questions as well as the quantitative information con-
tained in Appendices 1 and 2.
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Migrants and water service delivery in Khayelitsha
Living conditions
Almost all the respondents interviewed ‘owned’ the house they live in,
although understandings of ownership were not always the classic own-
ership of the land and house. Many of the houses that 73% of migrants
said they owned are informal shacks on land which is not legally theirs,
thus limiting ownership to the actual shack (shacks can be bought for
between R1 000 and R5 000). Most respondents, both men and women,
lived in tin shacks (57%) and 40% of households extended beyond the
usual nuclear family number of four to include other relatives. It should
be borne in mind that the 6 kl free water allocation per household per
month is based on a family of eight. This is one of the reasons both
environmental groups and unions have protested the basic allocation is
too little. In spite of this, it would seem that protest action in Khayelitsha
is limited to ad hoc engagements with government, as some 60% of re-
spondents indicated they had never protested, or did not know if they
had protested. Of the 40% who had protested, all had joined informal
protest actions against the local municipality. This limited participation
also extended to political identity and affiliation: not one male or fe-
male head of household was a member of any organisation that facili-
tated resistance or protest. The lack of political participation with re-
gard to basic services is borne out by Nielson’s (2003) survey of infor-
mal settlements which showed that 98-99% of informal settlement dwellers
had never been in touch with their municipality to enquire/complain
about leaks, burst pipes, water restrictions or the like.
Interview material does show, however, that where community ac-
tion has taken place, it has yielded results, even if this has been ad hoc
forms of resistance. ‘Andiswa’, who has been given her title deed by
government, told of how:
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We toyi-toyed when there was not enough (water)…We did
(protest) a lot because there was not enough (water) and be-
cause the cost was very high. I remember in 1996 they put a
lawyer in there.17 Why did they not come to speak to us
first?...So we go to protest…before we write the letter we
have a meeting…and the councillors say we must write a
letter…so we write, everybody writes, but we get no reply,
but after that we get the water. (Interview, August, 2004)
‘Thandi’ corroborated this in a second interview in the same area:
Yes (we did protest), that is why there is now a tap in every
section. (Interview, August, 2004)
However, the results of these ad hoc forms of protest were not com-
pletely satisfactory. In spite of the informal settlements’ rudimentary
water and sanitation project mentioned earlier, by which the Cape Town
City Council pledged for reasons of health and safety to provide at least
basic water and sanitation to all settlements regardless of the legality of
their land occupation, there are clearly many areas where this has not
yet taken place, even after the July 2004 deadline. Khayelitsha, for ex-
ample, is one of the older areas, and yet even here ‘Thandi’ pointed out
that as far back as the 1990s, “they talked about temporary toilets… but
nothing has happened”. As a result thousands of residents are forced to
walk to unoccupied land (the bush) raising issues of safety, hygiene and
health. Even where rudimentary toilets are in place it is still often the
case that these are far from safe or hygienic.
Follow up protest action has not taken place, despite very inadequate
or non-existent sanitation conditions in some areas. Neither ‘Thandi’
nor ‘Nomsa’ have access to toilets either communally or in their yard
and both have to use the field or rely on the goodwill of neighbours.
Both pointed out that this goodwill could not be stretched too far as
there were many in the community who did not have toilets and those
who did could become “cross” if asked for access all the time. Most
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often, the nearby bush had to serve and both indicated that this was not
safe, especially at night. Both had been living in the area for a number of
years. In addition, ‘Nomsa’ pointed out that over 500 people use the
single tap in her area, making the pressure on that one facility high. In
this same area there were no toilets, not even temporary ones.
In terms of the link between political identity, engagement and fi-
nancial position, only 56% of those interviewed had some form of non-
permanent employment, but what is interesting is the relative incomes
of the households in general, as opposed to the gender disaggregated
figures. Of the total, 18% earned between R100 and R550, 38% earned
between R550 and R950 and 35% earned between R950 and R1 500.
In contrast, women heads of households earn significantly less than
men. Thirty-seven per cent of women earned between R100 and R550,
36% earned between R550 and R950, and only 9% earned between R950
and R1 500. Interestingly, a larger number of women earned between
R1 500 and R4 500 – a gender disaggregated 9% as opposed to the aggre-
gate of 2%, perhaps showing some of the effects of affirmative action.
The ability of households to pay for water services as well as up-
grades is thus limited by their income. In spite of this, Nielson’s 2003
survey showed that 39% of informal settlement dwellers are prepared
to pay for service upgrades to ablution facilities. It may be that commu-
nity action demanding services is restricted to absolute essentials, namely
the supply of water, and that sanitation facilities, or the lack of them,
have not formed a lobbying point for protest action on a continuous
basis.
Rights
Another thought-provoking finding was the lack of knowledge among
interviewees around the right to FBW. While government has ostensi-
bly tried to ensure education in this regard, 79% of all respondents said
they did not understand their rights to water, although 38% did say
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they knew they had a right to a daily allowance of water. Lack of clarity
around what precisely these rights entail may be one of the factors pro-
hibiting participation here. For example, some respondents reply to the
question, “Do you know your rights to water?” would be a blunt “yes”,
but asked to explain, or prompted with the question, “Do you know of
your right to 25 litres per person per day?” the reply would then be
“no”. ‘Andiswa’ also gave voice to a commonly held belief when asked
about whether she understood her rights to water. Replying “yes”,  she
went on to say that “Jesus sends the water…so I have a right to that
water”. The belief that water is God-given and should not be something
that government should tithe, has occurred in this and other fieldwork
in Southern Africa on water and rights to water.
Nielsen’s study showed that “very few residents in informal areas
believe that they have access to 25 litres of free water per day (5%) and
even fewer (1%) have access to health and hygiene education”. Residents
also indicated that in general they were not consulted on decisions taken
by the CCT on the provision of basic water and sanitation. According
to Nielson’s survey data, only 27% had been consulted about basic serv-
ice delivery. This gives some indication of the extent to which govern-
ment also makes decisions on behalf of communities and then validates
these in terms of cultural preferences, for example the CCTs decision to
put  toilets and taps of the periphery of informal settlements which many
interviewees mentioned as unsafe and too far away to go to at night.
Safety
The vast majority of all respondents were concerned about safety. In
the CSAS study, 76% replied that they felt it was not safe to fetch water
or go to the toilet at night, as opposed to 98% in Nielson’s study. High
incidences of rape and assault occur in these areas and it is especially
unsafe for women and children. Ramsay, Director of Service Delivery
for CCT, is somewhat dismissive of this problem, stating:
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If you have got a 25 litre can and you fill it in the afternoon
it should hold for the evening. The toilet is the problem, rather
than the standpipe. There is a mixture of community views
on this issue. Some of them don’t like the toilets linked to the
house because of the smell. So some of the communities pre-
fer the toilets to be on the extremity even though this poses
risks at night. And there are various interpretations of what
is acceptable with regard to toilets. Some men prefer to uri-
nate outside the toilet because they don’t like to face the fae-
ces. Whether that is just because the condition of the toilet is
poor, or whether this is what people say they prefer is a diffi-
cult to establish. There are a lot of sensitivities around that.
Generally those toilets are not the kind of toilets you would
like to have next to your house. Density is also a problem.
(Interview, 18 May 2004)
This approach is somewhat insensitive to the fact that heads of house-
holds may not have time in the afternoon to “fill a 25 litre can”. It
naturalises the carrying of water in townships as normal and presumes
there are able bodied members of the household to do this during the
day or night. Carrying 25 litres of water in one go is quite a feat, even
for the strongest and most capable of men and women. Likewise, it
would appear that in many cases putting toilets on the periphery of
community settlements is also easier for government. Van Niekerk,
coordinator of the informal settlements services delivery upgrade pro-
gramme, states that community density and illegal land occupation also
play a large role in council’s decision to locate toilets on the periphery
of housing settlements. It would seem therefore that there is a tendency
to fall back on dubious  ‘ethnic preference’ hypotheses, rather than an
accurate understanding of what communities want. This is borne out
by interviewees’ comments on lack of consultation on questions of wa-
ter and sanitation supply on the part of the local municipality, as indi-
cated above.
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Ramsay does point out that there are insufficient channels of com-
munication in this regard between government and township commu-
nities:
We would love to have more participation, not only in terms
of infrastructural delivery but also in terms of education for
WDM. There is a lot of work still to be done in terms of
WDM education, i.e. what should go down a toilet and what
shouldn’t. But it takes a lot of staff, and council has made a
decision not to appoint any new staff so there has been an
attrition rate of about 5%. Manpower resources are thus se-
verely constrained. Public participation processes take a lot
of hard work…I think it is essential, but at the moment our
constraints are very high. So you will find that at the mo-
ment this [informal settlement upgrade] project to install these
facilities is a high priority – politically it is a high priority – so
you can appoint consultants to do the consulting, but it is
not sustainable. We should have the staff there so that a rela-
tionship is built up and that can sustain it through the diffi-
cult times. (Interview, 15 June 2004)
Clearly, ‘spaces’ for participation are somewhat constrained. This
may corroborate some of the points made earlier about the political
opportunity structures available to poor communities to mobilise and
to voice their opinions and exercise their rights.
Political identity and mobilisation
Another important finding of the Khayelitsha fieldwork was the de-
gree to which a large percentage of respondents appeared to lack politi-
cal affiliation. Of the total of both male and female respondents, 45%
said that they had no political affiliation. This percentage is even higher
among women, with 55% of women stating that they did not belong to
a political party. Given the extent to which the ANC’s organisational
structure has provided a platform for political participation (on wom-
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en’s issues, among other things), this might indicate a relative lack of
absorption into the structures which are in place and either a disaffec-
tion or lack of interest in party politics among the very poor.
Woman-headed households and water service
delivery in Khayelitsha
Living conditions, rights and mobilisation
As discussed above, in the sample the majority of women heads of house-
holds tended to be financially worse off than male heads of households,
although there are signs of a growing percentage of high income earners
among women. While only 18% of the aggregate total earned below
R550 a month, 37% of these were women. On the other hand, 15% of
women earned more than R1 500 a month. In woman-headed house-
holds 40% of the women were single, 24% were married with husbands
living elsewhere and 18% were divorced. Divorced and married women
received maintenance from (ex)husbands, but this was generally erratic.
In terms of this research, women were not significantly worse or better
off than men in terms of housing: 36% owned brick houses (i.e. they
legally owned both the house and the land through subsidisation) and
58% lived in tin shacks.
More women than men were not aware of their rights or did not
understand them. Only 24% of women respondents answered that they
understood their rights to water. Also, as mentioned earlier, a larger
percentage of woman-headed households pay for water: 49% as opposed
to 40% of the aggregate figure (men and women). Women had also
protested less than men: 67% of women respondents said they had never
protested about services. All women respondents also said they had no
organisational affiliation on services (i.e. did not belong to some form
of community grouping, such as water forums).
33
Migrants and water service delivery in the Western Cape:  Lisa Thompson & Thobani Matheza
It may be that the lack of mobilisation is due to the fact that service
delivery is about quality of life issues, which many poor heads of house-
holds may not have the time to address, as opposed to critical life or
death issues. Most respondents indicated that they had enough water
for washing and cleaning (58%) and all had some access to water, even if
it’s source was relatively far away. A greater percentage did not have
access to toilets (35%). It would seem that while basic service delivery is
being implemented in townships (at least in terms of FBW), quality of
access remains a huge problem, posing health and environmental safety
risks for communities as a whole, and in particular women and chil-
dren. In spite of this, mobilisation on issues of water service delivery
among migrant women remains minimal. Given the concern with health
and safety that all respondents expressed, it seems unusual that there is
not a greater level of mobilisation. This  may have something to do
with the fragmented political identities of migrant communities, both
men and women. These groups do not seem to display a high degree of
political involvement and a large percentage of them remain unaware of
their rights. The CSAS fieldwork planned for the next phase of this
research aims to investigate this aspect more closely.
Conclusion
While the fieldwork sample undertaken by the CSAS was very small, it
does highlight some thought-provoking issues with relation to mobili-
sation in general and the mobilisation of migrants, men and women, in
particular. While generalisations based on such a small sample are inevi-
tably only very tentative thoughts on possible community tendencies,
it would seem that the conclusions of Leysens (2004) following Cox’s
typologies are of some relevance: very marginalised groups tend not to
mobilise and a large percentage seem disengaged from the processes of
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democratic citizenship, although most do meet their responsibilities with
regard to paying for water, where this is applicable. In part this is due
to economic marginalisation, although there are indications that there
is potential for upward movement on the economic scale. Nonetheless
there does also seem to be a tendency to mobilise based on crisis issues
relating to water service delivery. This is largely spontaneous and unor-
ganised.
Many of the respondents stated that they did not feel they ‘belonged’
in Cape Town, and wished to return to their homes in the rural areas,
or to move elsewhere. ‘Andiswa’ echoes the feelings of other interview-
ees when she states that Khayelitsha is not home forever, and that she
wants her “children to learn and then after that I want to go back to the
Ciskei when I get my pension…I know my children want to stay, but
my future is there, Ciskei. I love my children to stay…I will come and
visit”. Furthermore, social cohesion and trust seem to be patchy, and all
respondents were concerned about their general safety in the townships.
Political identity appears weak in terms of political affiliation for both
men and women; similarly, there seems to be a lack of awareness about
community groupings, CBOs, NGOs and the like that take up ‘brown’
environmental issues, such as those related to water. This may partly be
to do with the displacement effect which internal migrants feel in the
townships, and partly to do with the relative lack of political opportu-
nities. As has been pointed out, government has created small  ‘spaces’
for participation, often on its own terms, and these tend to enforce its
policies and practices. There remains significant scope for social activ-
ism and mobilisation, but much of it appears unutilised, certainly in
relation to bigger water related issues such as the effect of the building
of the Skuifraam Dam on water tariffs and likewise government’s ten-
dency to fall back on water restrictions rather than comprehensive WDM
strategies.
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Where grassroots mobilisation occurs, it is also clear that global/
local environmental groups do not have the resources to sufficiently
galvanise communities. If this small study does highlight one clear ten-
dency, it is for marginalised groups to organise themselves around is-
sues important to their day-to-day survival only when these are deemed
critical. It remains to be seen, however, whether the situation in the
greater CCT will remain as non-conflictual on water and service deliv-
ery in the future, as the effects of supply side management take their
toll on rich and poor, migrants, marginalised and the mobilised alike.
The ability of the women’s movement, unions and the environmental
movement to form alliances on these issues of political and economic
rights will play themselves out in the context of issues such as rights to
water and other basic services. The extent to which migrants and espe-
cially women begin to form stronger community alliances which play
themselves into social movements may thus emerge in the years to come.
However, it would seem that the processes of social mobilisation among
marginalised migrant groups, particularly women, remain ad hoc and
unorganised with regard to their rights to water service delivery.
Endnotes
1 The Gender and Migration Project, funded by the Nor-
wegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad),
began in 1998 and ended in 2004.
2 Adequate housing is critical to adequate quality of water
services in urban areas. This study looks primarily at water
services, due to space constraints, but the type of housing
and service quality in water delivery is examined in some
detail.
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3 Survey questionnaires and qualitative questions were put
to 55 heads of households. This fieldwork was under-
taken by Thobani Matheza. This paper is written by Lisa
Thompson.
4 The video is available from the CSAS. The making of it
was made possible by funding from the Vlaamse
Universitaire Raad (VLIR), Norad and the UK Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID).
5 Poverty here is understood to mean erratic and/or low
income individuals or households with poor access to
housing and basic service infrastructure. Chronic pov-
erty relates to structural and social dynamics including a
lack of education and skills, and to nutritional and health
status, which prevent individuals or households from
improving their living standards. The figures in Appen-
dix 1 and 2 show that not all households in the CSAS
were chronically poor and a few may even be described
as only relatively poor. Measuring poverty – as attempted
by the UNDP and other organisations – does tend to try
to quantify its ‘measurable aspects’ to achieve compara-
tive perspective. Of course, disparities of wealth and rela-
tive opportunity in a specific context can contribute to
the psychological aspects of poverty in ways that are im-
possible to quantify. It is accepted that measuring pov-
erty is a subjective, context bound process, but at the
same time, the concept of poverty does serve to highlight
the vast structural and social disparities between commu-
nities and households. Nonetheless, in South Africa dis-
parities of wealth and privilege exacerbate the psycho-
logical aspects of relative poverty. For a detailed discus-
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sion of poverty in the South African context see de Swardt,
2004.
6 In his seminal work, Production, power and world order,
Cox has examined the configurations of social forces in
relations of production from the 1800s through to the
present to establish patterns in the types of state forma-
tions and world orders, and so assess the transformatory
potential of social forces within and between states. See
bibliography.
7 A small percentage (2%) earned more than this amount.
See Appendix 1.
8 The dataset is unfortunately not gender disaggregated.
9 There are no ratepayers associations in the traditionally
black (African) townships, as houses under R50 000 are
not liable for rates and taxes charges and building costs
for 98% of houses are between R20 000 and R25 000.
Ward councils exist, but none of our respondents were
active in them.
10 There is some inconsistency on this point given that HIV/
Aids is mentioned as a major contributor to slower popu-
lation growth rate figures over the next 10-20 years, while
projected growth is based on historical growth trends
over the last 10 years ( of 4%).
11 One innovative solution in terms of WDM is the CCTs
pressure regulation control mechanisms, which regulate
water pressure in peak and non-peak user times. Water
pressure is lowered in non-peak usage times to conserve
water, as the CCT is unable to keep up with service main-
tenance as a way of preventing water wastage (taps being
left open, broken, parts stolen etc.) (Mostert, interview,
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11 May 2004). Further schemes such as this pressure man-
agement one are being investigated. According to the
CCT’s Information Sheet on the scheme, “the savings
achieved on the project can be considered as sufficient to
fill an Olympic sized swimming pool every two hours, a
large concrete reservoir every day and a medium-sized
dam/reservoir every year”. The scheme was initiated in
2001 and completed in February 2002. Environmental
groups have argued that such WDM strategies could help
to shift the CCTs emphasis away from dam building and
supply side measures (CCT Khayelitsha Pressure Man-
agement Project Information Sheet, 2002).
12 In the case of the Berg Water Project, approval for build-
ing the Skuifraam Dam was sought in the early 1990s,
prior to the global environmental movement’s success in
lobbying governments towards more progressive policies
on dam building. Similarly, local mobilisation was spo-
radic, and driven by a few environmental organisations
with big agendas. The Environmental Monitoring Group
(EMG) and the Cape Town branch of the Wildlife and
Environmental Society of Southern Africa (WESSA)
played a role in questioning government’s motivation for
building the dam in the absence of an effective WDM
policy. WESSA was also instrumental in the setting up of
the Skuifraam Action Group (SAG) which presented its
case on the building of the dam to the World Commis-
sion on Dams Multi-stakeholder symposium in 2001.
Samwu also opposed the building of the dam on the basis
of the knock-on effects of higher tariffs on poorer com-
munities. However, government cited the participatory
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process which led up to the approval of the EIA as proof
that communities had had a chance to feed into govern-
ment environmental policy and WRM pertaining to the
building of the dam. Other community groupings, such
as the West Coast User group, only opposed the EIA
after it had been approved by government, and after the
‘official’ process of public participation. Government
could then legitimately state that it had sought public
approval and had conducted the necessary scientific sur-
veys, thereafter refusing to enter into further negotia-
tions with the environmental groups and Samwu on the
dam (Thompson, 2005).
13 The step up tariffs will mean a gradual increase in the
price of water (around 10% per annum) over the next
few years. Thereafter the tariff is, in theory, meant to
decrease again – however, the CCT has other water sup-
ply schemes in the pipeline. Whether the ‘step down’ tar-
iff ever takes place remains to be seen.
14 2% of  respondents’ questionnaires were incomplete.
15 Of the 38 heads of households headed de facto or de jure
by women, all were migrants from either the former
Ciskei or Transkei.
16 Assuming a low inflation rate of 6.5% the average water
tariff is set to rise by 10% between 2003/4 and 2006/7 –
or 50% in five years, and thereafter at between 5% and
9%.
17 To the old Stocks and Stocks building, which now houses
the municipality in Khayelitsha. Many respondents refer
to the municipality as  ‘Stocks and Stocks’.
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Appendix 1: Migrant interview information
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3. Who do you share with?
4. Who helped you find it (if renting) who helped you buy it (if owned)?
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5. Where do you get your water for washing, cleaning, cooking and
drinking?
Where do you get water?
53%45%
2%
Tap in the ho
Tap on the str
Missing
6. Do you have a toilet?
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7. Do you pay for water?
8. Do you have enough water for washing, cleaning, cooking and drinking?
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11. Have you ever protested about the cost of water?
12. Do you understand your rights to water?
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13. Do you know you are entitled to a daily allowance of free water?



















NB. Missing means people who did not answer the question during the
interview.
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15. Highest level of education
16. Gender balance
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Appendix 2: Gender disaggregated
information
1. Do you rent or own where you are living?
2. What sort of house is it?
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4. Have you ever protested about the cost of water?
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5. Do you understand your rights to water?
6. Income level per month
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9. Political affiliation
